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America is both a brief for and a very accessible
introduction to a quite different and understudied set of interventions.
Charles C. Brown
University of Michigan

L
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Industrial Policy and Development: The Political
Economy of Capabilities Accumulation. Edited
by Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph E.
Stiglitz. Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2009. Pp. xix, 575. $45.00, paper. ISBN 978–
0–19–923526–1, cloth; 978–0–19–923527–8,
pbk.
JEL 2010–0994
There has been a remarkable convergence over
the last several decades in thinking about the
building blocks of economic growth. The importance of macroeconomic stability, high rates of
physical and human capital investment, a strong
rule of law, and capable institutions are generally agreed to be critical components of success.
There is one ingredient, however, on which a typical economist in Beijing and a random professor
from Harvard or Princeton are likely to disagree:
the role for industrial policy.
The book Industrial Policy and Development:
the Political Economy of Capabilities
Accumulation makes a fervent case for the
supportive role played by industrial policy in
development. The book is coedited by three
well-known critics of laissez faire capitalism: Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph
Stiglitz. Like a number of other iconoclasts, they
see the 2008–09 financial crisis as heralding the
failure of modern capitalism. They are not shy
about their claims:
At last, the realization of the impressive
failures of the recipe has finally sobered up
a significant share of both economists and
policy makers . . . the tsunami hitting the
world financial markets is forcing even the
most stubborn believers in the miraculous
properties of ‘markets’ to accept markets as
they exist and not as they are portrayed in
economic textbooks . . . this book, however,

is not about beating a dead horse . . . rather,
this book is about industrial policies seen
as intrinsic fundamental ingredients of all
development processes. (1)
The vision of development and the critical role
for industrial policy proposed by the various contributors in this volume could be summarized
as follows. Economic growth occurs when an
economy is able to go through radical structural
shifts, such as the movement from an agrarian to
an industrial economy. That change can only happen through the accumulation of knowledge, the
implementation or adaption of new technology,
and the coordination across many different sectors. The source of the market failure stems from
both the public goods nature of knowledge as well
as the coordination problems involved in bringing
together many different actors to make innovation
happen. The authors are skeptical that the market
by itself will both generate sufficient knowledge
and solve the coordination problem. Hence they
argue that there is a critical role for industrial
policy. They write that “the idea that a Toyota, a
Samsung, a Tata, an Embraer can just naturally
spring up out of a multitude of peasants, just due,
again, to the ‘magic of the market’, is a fairy tale
that few ought to be ready to believe” (4).
In their view, the effectiveness of industrial
policy involves the interplay of two forces: congruence between “ingredients,” such as investment in human capital and subsidies to pivotal
sectors, and the “institutions” that would allow
the coordination and exploitation of knowledge.
Hence, success of industrial policy will require
an interaction of key policies (such as educational investments or R&D) and institutions that
ensure that those policies are used to transform
the economy and not to line the pockets of rentseeking politicians.
From this perspective, allowing a country’s
development path to follow market forces will
condemn it to languish forever in the land of
cheap textiles and shoddy toys. Comparative
advantage can be tinkered with. No country has
moved from a backward to a leading industrial
producer without extensive involvement from the
state in the form of tariffs, subsidies, and targeted
sector-level support.
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One of the most provocative claims by the
authors is that the successful industrial countries applied steep tariffs on their way to success, and now seek to maintain their edge by
discouraging its use among others. One ongoing
theme is that all successful industrializers, from
Germany and the United States two centuries
ago to Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, China, and India,
have used industrial policy. Chapter 6 (written
by Yilmaz Akyuz) is particularly effective, documenting very high tariff rates in Great Britain,
Germany, France, and the United States. Akyuz,
a former director at UNCTAD, points out that in
the past, “protectionism was the rule, free trade
the exception” (147). It was only after World War
II that the United States reduced its tariffs from
averages of 20 to 50 percent, having successfully
established its dominance behind protectionist
barriers. Akyuz attacks computable general equilibrium studies suggesting extravagant benefits
from liberalizing for developing countries under
the Uruguay Round. He points out that many of
these studies focus on static gains from trade,
while what developing countries care about are
innovation and the ability to shift comparative
advantage so that countries end up on a higher
growth trajectory.
This argument is missing a crucial step. Simply
because the United States had high tariffs while it
was developing into a world power does not prove
that the United States developed because of its
high tariffs. Perhaps the United States (or China,
or India) would have grown even faster without
these high tariffs. We don’t know what the counterfactual would have been. To identify the gains
from industrial policy would require either a
properly implemented randomized trial—where
some countries or sectors are randomly allocated
high tariffs—or a convincing instrumental variable approach. The authors of the volume present
neither.
This fallacy is one important weakness of this
otherwise intriguing book. In the second half of
the book, the authors present country case studies. So we learn that Latin American countries
extensively employed industrial policy throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In the 1990s,
there has been a return to the use of industrial
policies, including sector-level encouragement,
cluster policies, and so-called horizontal policies
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which are in theory neutral but ex post always
promote some sectors over others. The real
issue—as Wilson Peres points out in his chapter
on “The (Slow) Return of Industrial Policies in
Latin America and the Caribbean”—is the lack
of impact evaluation to allow us to link sectoral or
country success with the use of industrial policy.
My least favorite chapter explores the role of
multinational firms. Alice Amsden argues that
foreign firms do not play an important role in
the industrialization and catch up of developing
countries. All the evidence that I have seen (see
my summary of the literature in Harrison and
Rodriguez Clare (2010) or my work on China in
Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2012)) contradicts
this claim. Accumulated evidence shows that joint
ventures consistently exhibit higher productivity
and play an important role in promoting industrialization through vertical linkages with domestic suppliers. Amsden, who claims that MNCs in
developing countries act like bureaucrats without
any important innovative or entrepreneurial role,
does not provide evidence to back up her claims.
On the other hand, I particularly enjoyed the
iconoclastic treatment of Industrial Policy in India,
written by Ajit Singh. Singh presents a rebuttal
to the orthodox claim that India’s industrial policies hurt the country and that without them India
would have done much better. In the 1980s, India’s
growth rate accelerated. Some have attributed this
change to globalization and dismantling of the
industrial policy regime but Singh argues that the
results were due to internal deregulation and not
to abandonment of India’s industrial policy. He
also argues that India’s achievement in science and
technology was accomplished by following an educational path dictated by the country’s own political economy rather than by implementing policies
advocated by the World Bank.
Singh argues that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, India’s great success with information
technology was due in large part to its industrial
policy, not to the fact that this sector benefited
from benign neglect. In assessing the information technology sectors success, he suggests that
“the characterization of benign neglect by the
government is grossly inaccurate and misleading”
(284). India’s comparative advantage in software
development, which stems from its comparative
advantage of cheap skilled labor, “did not arise
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spontaneously but was helped, in fact established,
by the government” (285). Government support
helped not only in the information technology
sector but also in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. The government played a
critical role in the establishment of Bangalore as
a hub attracting the bulk of India’s scientific and
technological activity. Looking forward, Singh
sees industrial policy as critical in helping to
foster employment-creating growth and helping
to address the problem of rising inequality.
Ultimately, what policymakers would like to
know is which kinds of industrial policies have
been most successful and how should industrial
policy be used—if at all—going forward? In particular, have the benefits of industrial policy from
addressing market failure outweighed the possible
costs of government failure? There is one chapter
that specifically addresses this issue—chapter
13. Chapter 13 correctly identifies the biggest
puzzle associated with industrial policies: different countries have adopted seemingly identical
policies, but the outcomes are quite different. As
an example, Brazil tried the same types of export
promotion policies adopted by South Korea, but
did not succeed. The question is why. The chapter takes a different tone than the usual explanation based on the weak capacity of the state.
Mushtaq Khan and Stephanie Blankenburg, the
chapter authors, argue that blaming the failure
of industrial policy on weak state capacity underestimates the importance of industrial policy in
successful developing countries. They also argue
that the distinctive feature of successful East
Asian industrial policy was not exceptional state
capacities. Rather the distinctive feature of success was “that the particular variant of industrial
policy that each tried was compatible with internal power balances that allowed the state to create incentives and compulsions in critical areas”.
They continue on page 344:
The widespread failure of developing countries to catch up with advanced countries is at
least partly attributable to the failure of their
institutions to compel productivity growth
in the learning industries, which requires
institutions that can manage provided rents
and provide credible compulsions and conditions for rapid learning. Thus, the institutions

for inducing learning must both provide the
incentives for learning and have the credibility to impose costs and sanctions on industries
and firms that fail to achieve the required
rate of learning. If the state does not have
the credibility to withdraw a subsidy when
there is underperformance, there will be a
short-run costs as well as a permanent cost,
because infant industries will never grow up.
The authors suggest that states are unlikely to
have the capacity to be able to first provide and
subsequently withdraw rents when a country has
both a strong landed elite and early urbanization.
Reading this essay, I found it difficult to see the
difference between exceptional state capability
(which the authors argue is not necessary) and
the ability to design industrial policies in line
with state capacity.
This volume is a pleasure to read for several
reasons. First, it brings together in one book the
different proponents for industrial policy and
the range of arguments for its implementation.
This book aligns itself against the Washington
Consensus view, and makes it clear that in many
parts of the world there is no such “consensus”
that laissez faire is optimal. The volume is also
very persuasive in documenting the extensive
use of industrial policy across all countries, and
its historically important role in the now successful industrial countries. Finally, the book brings
together a number of arguments for why industrial policy is needed.
The book comes up short in two respects. First,
it fails to persuade the reader that the use of IP
led to better outcomes. The authors argue that
their thesis is not amenable to empirical testing, because they are focusing on the interaction
between good (IP) policies and proper enabling
institutions. But a clever empiricist could introduce such an interaction in an estimating equation. More fundamentally, without any sort of
serious empirical work attempting to sort out the
identification from policies to outcomes, it is difficult for the reader to accept correlation as proof.
Second, what policy makers need is a practical
“how to” guide that will help them successfully
address market failures and minimize rent-seeking from greedy agents. Chapter 13 begins to
address this question but ends with very g eneral
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statements about the need to tailor industrial
policy to each state’s individual capabilities. One
solution, which I advocate with my coauthors
(Aghion et al. 2012), is to ensure that all industrial
policies are conducted in a highly competitive
environment. The book is agnostic and sometimes
contradictory on the need to combine industrial
policy with competition, which it shouldn’t be.
India’s industrial policies and the License Raj
would have been much more effective if internal
competition had been encouraged. Nevertheless,
the book is engaging and refreshing in its perspective. All too frequently, collected volumes
put together a disparate set of viewpoints, which
leave the reader bewildered. In this volume, the
authors speak with nearly one voice. While not
everyone will agree with this book, it presents a
viewpoint which has resonated in East Asia. For
that reason alone, readers should take note.
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The Economics of Collusion is a compact treatise that examines cooperative behavior among
supposed free-market competitors.1 Robert
Marshall and Leslie Marx (not Alfred and
Karl) synthesize recent research on cartels and
1
This review was prepared while the author was a
Visiting Scholar at the University of South Australia.
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c ollusion in a style that generally is accessible to
human beings (vis-à-vis professional economists).
The mathematics is limited and examples are
numerous, although most references to the literature are, curiously, limited to recent decades.
There was serious study of cartels before the
1980s that uncovered many essential insights still
used today.
The volume benefits enormously from the
authors’ experience working on antitrust matters. It would be richer if it incorporated tales
from more of the classic price-fixing cases. For
example, I would think it is difficult to write a
book about collusion in the manufacturing sector (Marshall and Marx focus on homogeneous
manufactured intermediate goods) without
mentioning the very first federally prosecuted
cartel, Jellico Mountain Coal (1891), or the Great
Electrical Conspiracy of the 1950s, in which
Westinghouse, General Electric, Allis-Chalmers,
and several dozen other sellers of large-scale electrical equipment to public utilities were convicted
of price fixing. (Lean, Ogur, and Rogers 1982.)
Their agreements were varied, involving identical
bids, pricing formulas for complicated products,
and even a “phases of the moon” system used to
allocate the low-bid for high voltage switchgear.
The bidding ring eventually was brought to the
attention of federal antitrust authorities by a purchasing agent who noticed patterns in the bids.
Federal prosecution in 1960–61 led to the incarceration of seven executives, the first time price
fixers found themselves staring out at the world
through vertical bars rather than off the country
club veranda. The story fits into Marshall and
Marx’s book well, offering numerous examples
supporting their theses, and for several decades
was the big collusion story.
The authors highlight a helpful subtle distinction between a cartel comprised of all firms in
an industry and a single-firm monopoly, which
superficially may appear to be quite similar.
While a monopoly is transparently a single seller
with market power, a successful cartel is clandestine, promoting the appearance of a competitive
industry, thereby inducing suppliers or customers
that deal with it to relax their guard and possibly
dispense with strategies to diminish or combat
the economic power of the invisible monopolist
or monopsonist. Moreover, a clandestine cartel

